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To the Editor: In August 1999, the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
was established to better integrate and
improve laboratory capacity for
responding to public health threats
(1). However, while experts have
focused on clinical indications for
testing for agents of bioterrorism, lab-
oratory methods for microbial identi-
fication, and needs for integrated
communication networks (2–4), little
attention has been given to how sen-
tinel laboratories can effectively
screen clinicians’ requests for testing
pathogens designated as global health
threats.
In times of crisis, clinicians often
pressure laboratorians to perform test-
ing for patients whose probability for
disease is very low or for nonvalidat-
ed sample types. In 2001, a few cases
of anthrax triggered large numbers of
nationwide requests to test nasal
swabs for Bacillus anthracis despite
the absence of data to support this
clinical practice outside epidemiolog-
ic investigations (5). Similarly, a
false-positive result for severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003
from the National Microbiology
Laboratory in Canada created public
alarm that SARS was reemerging,
when the virus was actually that of a
common respiratory illness in a nurs-
ing home (6). The problem is further
complicated when laboratories other
than the LRN lack standardization,
have greater access to nucleic acid
amplification-based testing, and
develop tests for global health threats
outside a quality-regulated system.
False-positive results caused by con-
tamination or cross-reactivity with a
microorganism of low virulence can
disrupt a public health system,
adversely affect patient care, and
increase costs (6–8); false-negative
results may prompt clinicians to
discontinue containment procedures
and potentially risk transmitting a vir-
ulent microorganism. At our sentinel
laboratory, we recognized these chal-
lenges and took steps to promote judi-
cious use of testing for agents desig-
nated as global health threats. We
report use of an algorithm to evaluate
test requests for SARS-associated
coronavirus and highly pathogenic
avian influenza H5N1; however, the
algorithm can be used to screen test-
ing requests for any pathogen that has
potential to threaten public health.
During outbreaks of SARS and
H5N1, a laboratory protocol was
established to notify the on-call labo-
ratory professional when a sample
was received for testing for 1 of these
pathogens (Figure). The protocol
required the laboratorian to communi-
cate directly with the clinician, using
a script with questions based on crite-
ria established by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, to
determine the medical necessity for
testing (9,10). Samples from patients
not meeting these criteria were reject-
ed. Testing for SARS used an in-
house real-time PCR assay with a
standard laboratory protocol. Samples
accepted for H5N1 testing were
screened by a nonspecific hemagglu-
tinin influenza PCR assay and, if
results were positive, were to be for-
warded to an LRN laboratory.
Positive results were to be reported
only after confirmation by an LRN
laboratory. Laboratory professionals
were specifically trained about the
sensitivity, specificity, positive pre-
dictive value, and negative predictive
value of test methods in relation to
sample type, time between symptom
onset and specimen collection, and
disease prevalence.
Of 41 samples (40 SARS and 1
H5N1) received for testing, 26 (63%)
samples were not tested because clini-
cian responses failed to satisfy the
screening criteria. The remaining 15
(37%) samples met criteria for testing
and all had negative results. In theLETTERS
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absence of positive results, no confir-
matory testing was indicated.
Although SARS no longer poses a
credible threat and human-to-human
transmission of H5N1 has not been
well delineated, our experiences with
these 2 pathogens demonstrate how a
sentinel laboratory can effectively
intervene in the initial phases of a
public health threat. We found that
having a laboratory professional con-
tact the clinician and systematically
ask the scripted questions was a prag-
matic tool for the first phase of
response and resulted in cancellation
of most tests. We acknowledge that
optimal validation of this algorithm
would require randomly selecting and
testing rejected specimens during a
phase of high disease prevalence.
Although low disease prevalence dur-
ing our study period precluded valida-
tion testing, we recommend that such
testing be performed.
Our systematic approach to
screening requests to test for agents
with the potential to threaten global
health can prevent arbitrary decision
making, reduce inappropriate testing,
and increase the value of laboratory
consultation. The principles guiding
our testing protocols for SARS and
avian influenza can be generalized to
future global health threats.
Responsible and judicious use of
diagnostic testing will be crucial for
minimizing the risk of providing cli-
nicians with misleading results that
could severely disrupt the public
health system and lead to an unneces-
sary expenditure of limited resources.
With the emergence of highly patho-
genic avian influenza, we anticipate
further demands on laboratory and
public health resources that will
necessitate effective, pragmatic tools
to enhance the value of laboratorian-
clinician consultation before tests are
performed on site or referred to an
LRN laboratory.
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Figure. Laboratory algorithm used to screen test requests for avian influenza H5N1 or
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)